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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING CORP., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION, dba JACK'S 
SOUTHWEST COLLISION REPAIR and 
JOHN W. CUMBERLEDGE, JR., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Appellate Court No. 98-0062 CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION ET AL. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellants appeal from a final order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
the Honorable William W. Barrett presiding, granting judgment in favor of appellee Colonial 
Pacific Leasing Corporation. The instant appeal was commenced in the Utah Supreme Court, 
with jurisdiction conferred upon that court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1997). 
The Utah Supreme Court subsequently poured-over this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Did the trial court err in concluding that appellants breached the subject lease 
agreement with Colonial Pacific by failing to make payments under the lease, where the leased 
computer equipment did not function properly, and where Colonial Pacific informed appellants 
that the lease would be canceled if no payment statements were sent? STANDARD OF 
REVIEW: The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo under the correction of error 
standard of review, and this Court will accord no particular deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. United Park Citv Mines Co. v. Greater Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 
1993); State v. Pena. 869 R2d 932. 936 (Utah 1994V RECORD CITATION: This issue was 
raised below in Appellant's Trial Brief and at pages 12-17, 50, 58-66, and 94-101 of the Record 
(Trial Transcripts), and has therefore been preserved for appeal. 
Issue #2: Did the trial court err in failing to conclude, as a matter of law, that there was 
no acceptance of the leased computer equipment by appellants? STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo under the correction of error standard of 
review, and this Court will accord no particular deference to the trial court's conclusions. United 
Park Citv IVGnes Co. v. Greater Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). RECORD CITATION: This issue was raised below in Appellant's 
Trial Brief and at pages 14-17, 58-66, and 95-96 of the Record. 
Issue #3: Did the trial court err in failing to make findings as to whether appellants were 
entitled to a thirty day trial period within which to test the leased computer equipment, and in 
failing to conclude that a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease had not been 
met? STANDARD OF REVIEW: Under the "correctness" or "correction of error" standard, 
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Utah appellate courts grant no particular deference to the trial court's rulings on questions of law, 
and may review them in a de novo fashion on appeal. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater 
Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Statev.Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
RECORD CITATION: This issue was raised below in Appellant's Trial Brief and at pages 60-
66y 72, and 96 of the Record. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The following statutory authorities are either determinative in this appeal or are of such 
central importance as to merit their inclusion herein: 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515(l) (1997): 
Acceptance of goods occurs after: (a) the lessee has had a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect the goods and the lessee signifies or acts with respect 
to the goods in a manner that signifies to the lessor or the supplier that the 
goods are conforming or that the lessee will take or retain them in spite of 
their nonconformity; or (b) the lessee fails to make an effective rejection of 
the goods as provided in Subsection 70A-2a-509(2). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-509(l), (2) (1997): 
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 70A-2a-510 on default in 
installment lease contracts, if the goods or the tender or delivery fail in any 
respect to conform to the lease contract, the lessee may reject or accept the 
goods or accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest of the 
goods. 
(2) Rejection of goods is ineffective unless it is within a reasonable time 
after tender or delivery of the goods and the lessee seasonably notifies the 
lessor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-103(l)(g) (1997): 
"Finance lease" means a lease in which: (I) the lessor does not select, 
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manufacture, or supply the goods; (ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the 
right to possession and use of the goods in connection with the lease; and 
(iii) one of the following occurs:... (D) if the lease is not a consumer lease, 
the lessor, before the lessee signs the lease contract, informs the lessee in 
writing: (I) of the identity of the person supplying the goods to the lessor, 
unless the lessee has selected that person and directed the lessor to acquire 
the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods from that person; 
(IX) that the lessee is entitled under this chapter to the promises and 
warranties, including those of any third party, provided to the lessor by the 
person supplying the goods in connection with or as part of the contract by 
which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the 
goods; and (HI) that the lessee may communicate with the person supplying 
the goods to the lessor and receive an accurate and complete statement of 
those promises and warranties, including any disclaimer and limitations of 
them or of remedies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-407 (1997): 
(1) In the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, the lessee's 
promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon 
the lessee's acceptance of the goods. (2) A promise that has become 
irrevocable afld independent under Subsection (1): (a) is effective and 
enforceable between the parties, and by or against third parties including 
assignees of the parties; and (b) is not subject to cancellation, termination, 
modification, repudiation, excuse, or substitution without the consent of the 
party to whom the promise runs. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, the 
Honorable William W. Barrett presiding, granting judgment against appellants in the amount of 
$21,275.30 for breach of a finance lease agreement. Appellants, as lessees under the subject lease 
agreement, bring this appeal challenging the trial court's legal conclusion that they were 
4 
responsible for making payments under the lease even though the leased goods were non-
conforming and were never accepted. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below 
On February 4,1997, Colonial Pacific Leasing Corporation (hereinafter "Colonial 
Pacific") commenced this action by filing a complaint with the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, Division H A pretrial conference before Judge William W. Barrett was held on 
March 24,1997, whereupon the court set the matter for trial on July 18,1997. On July 17,1997, 
only one day before trial, Colonial Pacific filed an ex-parte motion to continue the trial date, 
purportedly due to the unavailability of a witness. The trial court granted the motion to continue 
and rescheduled the trial for September 29,1997. No hearing was held on the motion prior to the 
court entering its decision. Appellant's counsel subsequently sought argument on the motion 
before the trial court, which was granted. The trial court then upheld its decision to continue the 
trial date. 
A one day trial was held on September 29,1997, following which the court took the 
matter under advisement. This appeal is taken from the trial court's final Order and Judgment 
entered on December 30, 1997, granting judgment against appellants for breach of a finance lease. 
No prior nor related appeals have been taken. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. On June 9,1993, J.W.C.J.R. Corporation entered into a lease contract with 
Colonial Pacific for the lease of a 386 computer system and certain collision repair estimate 
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software. (Findings of Fact #1.) 
2. John W. Cumberledge, Jr., as owner of J.W.C.J.R., was required to sign a written 
guarantee of the lease contract, which he did. On June 9, 1993, he was also asked to sign an 
"Acknowledgement and Acceptance of Equipment by Lessee," even though he had not yet 
received the leased goods. (Findings of Fact #2; Trial Transcripts ("T.T.") at 14,47, 58.) 
3- Sometime around June 10,1993, the leased goods were delivered and installed at 
lessees' place of business by Bottomline Systems, Inc. (hereinafter "Bottomline"), but the 
equipment did not function properly. (Findings of Fact #4; T.T. at 12, 58-60.) 
4. J.W.C J.R. and Cumberledge Jr. (collectively referred to hereinafter as "lessees") 
were told by Bottomline that they would have a thirty day trial period within which to test the 
leased equipment to ensure that it was operational and would meet their needs. (T.T. at 60, 62, 
72.) 
5. Lessees informed Colonial Pacific on at least two occasions that the equipment 
was not operational. (Findings of Fact #5; T.T. at 12, 58-59, 65-66, 70-71.) 
6. Despite repeated requests by lessees to have Bottomline examine the equipment, 
lessees were unable to get Bottomline to make an inspection. As a result, lessees asked a business 
associate, Alan Shupe, to attempt to get the equipment to operate. Shupe examined the 
equipment but was unable to get the system to operate properly. (T.T. at 60-64, 65, 76-77.) 
7. Within three weeks after delivery of the leased goods, lessees boxed up the 
equipment and returned it to Bottomline. (Findings of Fact #6; T.T. at 63-64, 72, 76-77.) 
& Lessees informed Colonial Pacific that the leased equipment was junk, and that it 
had been returned to the supplier. They were told by a representative of Colonial Pacific that if 
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they did not receive a payment statement, that they could assume the lease was canceled. (T.T. at 
17, 63-66.) 
9. Lessees never received a payment statement from Colonial Pacific, and assumed 
the lease had been canceled. (T.T. at 63-71.) 
10. More than two years later, Colonial Pacific informed lessees that they were in 
default under the subject lease agreement for failure to make payments under the lease. (T.T. at 
16-17,43, 71.) 
11. Colonial Pacific subsequently accelerated all payments due under the lease, and 
instituted legal proceedings against lessees for failure to pay for a 386 computer system that 
lessees had for three weeks and could never get to operate properly. (T.T. at 21,63-64, 72, 76-
77.) 
12. Patty Bost, a representative of Colonial Pacific's legal department, testified that 
although lessees' account had fallen into a "black hole," the lease was noncancellable. (T.T. at 
17, 19, 50.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that lessees were responsible for 
making payments to Colonial Pacific under the parties' finance lease agreement. Pursuant to the 
Utah Commercial Code, a finance lease becomes noncancellable only upon acceptance of the 
leased goods by the lessee. In the instant case, no acceptance of the leased goods ever occurred. 
The lessees had the equipment for about three weeks, and were never able to get it to function 
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properly. The trial court's own findings of fact evidence a lack of acceptance by the lessees. 
These findings simply cannot be squared with the trial court's legal conclusions, which upheld the 
validity of the lease under the Utah Commercial Code, requiring lessees to make payments to 
make payments to Colonial Pacific despite their timely rejection. Inasmuch as the leased 
equipment was nonconforming and never accepted by the lessees, the trial court's legal 
conclusions are erroneous as a matter of law. This Court should therefore overturn the trial 
court's decision. 
This Court should also overturn the trial court's decision because Colonial Pacific failed to 
satisfy a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease agreement. Lessees were 
promised a thirty day trial period within which to test the leased computer equipment to ensure 
that it was operational and would meet their needs. Lessees had the equipment for three weeks 
but were never able to get it to operate. Consequently, they boxed up the equipment and returned 
it to the supplier. They were then told by Colonial Pacific that if they did not receive a payment 
statement, they could assume the lease was canceled. Lessees never received a payment 
statement, nor did they have any other contact with Colonial Pacific for more than two years. 
Clearly, the parties understood that a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease 
had not been met, and that the lease had been timely canceled. The trial court erred in failing to 
make findings regarding the failure of a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease, 




L LESSEES NEVER ACCEPTED THE LEASED GOODS, BUT 
INSTEAD TIMELY REJECTED THEM AS NONCONFORMING 
The trial court erred in concluding that lessees were responsible for making payments to 
Colonial Pacific under the parties' finance lease agreement, because the leased goods were 
nonconforming and were never accepted by the lessees. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-
407, a lessee's promise to make payments under a finance lease becomes irrevocable upon 
acceptance of the leased goods. Thereafter, such a promise cannot be canceled nor repudiated 
without the consent of the lessor. As the following discussion will demonstrate, lessees in the 
instant case never accepted the leased goods, but instead timely rejected them as nonconforming. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that lessees breached the subject lease agreement by 
failing to make payments under the lease. 
A* The Trial Court's Legal Conclusions Cannot Be Reconciled with the 
Court's Findings of Fact 
The trial court's conclusions of law assume, without explicitly stating, that lessees 
accepted the leased goods, and thus became irrevocably committed to making payments under the 
lease. For example, the court's conclusion of law #1 provides: "The Defendants entered a valid 
and binding lease contract with Plaintiff." Similarly, the court's conclusion of law #2 states: "The 
lease contract is governed by the provisions of the Utah Commercial Code wherein it is 
categorized as a finance lease." Finally, the court's conclusion of law #4 provides: "The 
Defendants' failure to make payments to Plaintiff pursuant to the finance lease constituted a 
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breach of contract."1 These legal conclusions rest on the assumption that lessees accepted the 
leased goods. Such an assumption, however, finds no support at all in the trial court's findings of 
fact. Instead, those findings clearly demonstrate not only a lack of acceptance by lessees, but a 
timely rejection of the leased goods. 
The following findings of fact were made by the Court on December 30,1997: 
3. Defendant J.W.CJ.R. used Plaintiffs financing to procure computer 
equipment from Bottomline Systems, Inc. 
4. The equipment was delivered and installed at Defendant J.W.C.J.R.'s 
place of business by Bottomline Systems, Inc., but it did not function 
properly. 
5. Defendant John Cumberledge informed Plaintiff on two occasions 
that the equipment was not operational. 
6. The equipment was returned to Bottomline Systems, Inc. subsequent 
to the signing and execution of the finance lease. 
7* The Defendants were not contacted by Plaintiff until approximately 
two years thereafter, at which time Plaintiff sought payment in full from 
Defendants. 
(Findings of Fact Nos. 3-7, December 30, 1997) (emphasis added). Taken together, these 
findings clearly support the conclusion that lessees timely rejected the leased goods, and that both 
parties understood the lease had been canceled. Lessees had the equipment for no more than 
three weeks, and then promptly returned it to the supplier after they were unable to get the system 
to operate properly. The trial court's findings simply cannot be reconciled with the court's legal 
conclusions, which upheld the validity of the lease despite the lessees' timely rejection. Lessees 
xThe lease agreement itself states that any litigation regarding the validity and enforcement 
of the lease would be governed by Oregon law, with jurisdiction residing in the State of Oregon. 
(Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit #1, para. 7.) However, Colonial Pacific instituted this legal proceeding in 
Utah, and both parties argued the case at trial under Utah law. 
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respectfully submit that the trial court's legal conclusions are erroneous as a matter of law, and 
ask this Court to reverse the trial court's decision and dismiss this matter with prejudice. 
B. The Evidence, when Marshaled, Compels the Conclusion that 
Lessees Timely Rejected the Leased Goods 
The central issue in this case is whether lessees accepted the leased goods, thus making 
their promise to pay under the lease irrevocable. The term "acceptance of goods" is defined at 
section 70A-2a-515(l) of the Utah Commercial Code, which provides: 
Acceptance of goods occurs after: 
(a) the lessee has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods and the 
lessee signifies or acts with respect to the goods in a manner that signifies to 
the lessor or the supplier that the goods are conforming or that the lessee 
will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity; or 
(b) the lessee fails to make an effective rejection of the goods as provided in 
Subsection 70A-2a-509(2). 
Pursuant to this definition, acceptance does not occur until after lessees have been given a 
reasonable opportunity to make an inspection. What constitutes a "reasonable opportunity to 
inspect" is generally left for the trier of fact to determine. Lish v. ComptoiL 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 
1976); Cervitor Kitchens Inc. v. Chapman. 500 P.2d 783 (1972), afiPd 513 P.2d 25 (Wash. 1973). 
A short duration of time might be appropriate in the case of perishable goods, whereas a longer 
period would be appropriate for more complex and highly sophisticated machinery. Highland Rim 
Constructors v. Atlantic Software Corp., 1992.TN.1470 (http://www.versuslaw.com) (concluding 
buyer timely rejected defective computer equipment after thirty day trial period) (a copy of this 
case is found in Appendix hereinafter). In the instant case, the evidence, when marshaled, clearly 
demonstrates not only a lack of acceptance of the leased goods by the lessees, but an attempt by 
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Colonial Pacific to deny lessees of their right to make a reasonable inspection. 
Only two items of evidence offered at trial can be marshaled in favor of a finding of 
acceptance by the lessees. These items of evidence are set forth below: 
(1) Lessees signed a document entitled "Acknowledgement and Acceptance of 
Equipment by Lessee." (Plaintiff9s Trial Exhibit #2.) The Acknowledgement states that lessees 
have received the leased equipment, and acknowledge that the equipment has been properly 
installed and inspected. The Acknowledgement further provides that the equipment is operating 
properly in all respects, and states that: "Lessee hereby accepts unconditionally and irrevocably 
the Equipment." (Id.) 
(2) Patty Bost, Colonial Pacific's litigation specialist, testified at trial that Colonial 
Pacific called lessees on two occasions after the lease was signed. The first call occurred on June 
10, 1993. The second call occurred the next day on June 11,1993, at which time Colonial Pacific 
was told that the equipment was installed and operational, and that it was okay to start the lease. 
(T.T. at 13; Plaintiffs Exhibit #3.) 
At first blush, these facts would appear to provide at least some evidentiary support for a legal 
conclusion that lessees accepted the equipment. However, when these facts are scrutinized, such 
a conclusion cannot possibly be reached. 
First, it is undisputed that lessees signed the Acknowledgement before actually receiving 
the leased equipment. Therefore, the assertions contained in the Acknowledgement are untrue on 
their face. Unfortunately, it appears to be a standard business practice of Colonial Pacific to 
encourage their customers to lie by signing the Acknowledgement before ever receiving delivery 
of the leased goods. (T.T. at 14-15, 44-48; see also McNatt v. Colonial Pacific Leasing. 472 
S.E.2d 435 (1996) (lessee under lease with Colonial Pacific pressured into signing 
Acknowledgement in advance of actually receiving the equipment)). In any event, because lessees 
signed the subject Acknowledgement before receiving the equipment, the Acknowledgement by 
itself clearly provides an untenable basis for concluding that lessees accepted the equipment. 
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Nor does the telephone conversation of June 11, 1993, fair any better. This conversation 
occurred only two days after the lease agreement was signed, and only one day after lessees 
informed Colonial Pacific that they were having problems getting the equipment to operate 
properly. Again, under the Utah Commercial Code, acceptance does not occur until after lessees 
have been given a reasonable opportunity to make an inspection. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-
515(1) (1997). In the instant case, Colonial Pacific provided lessees with only two days to make 
an inspection. This period was unreasonably short, especially since Colonial Pacific had been 
notified one day earlier that lessees were having problems with the equipment. In its rush to make 
lessees irrevocably committed to making payments under the lease, Colonial Pacific has attempted 
to deny lessees of their statutory right to a reasonable inspection. This Court should conclude 
that two days did not provide lessees with a reasonable opportunity to inspect. This Court should 
further conclude that after lessees were given a reasonable opportunity to inspect, they timely 
rejected the leased goods. This conclusion is compelled by the following catalog of evidence: 
(1) Lessees received the equipment on or about June 10, 1993, one day after signing 
the lease. That same day, lessees informed Colonial Pacific by telephone that the equipment was 
not operational. Patty Bost testified: "We originally called [lessees] on June 10th. We spoke with 
John Cumberiedge, he said that the equipment is delivered, that it was not all working yet and that 
the vendor was coming out to work on it." (T.T. at 12-13; 58-59.) 
(2) Almost immediately after Colonial Pacific called on June 11, 1993, and was told 
the equipment was functioning, the equipment seized up and would not operate nor do what it 
was supposed to do. Lessees called Bottomline to have them check out the problem, but 
Bottomline never showed up to make any repairs. (T.T. at 59-60.) 
(3) Lessees called Bottomline on numerous occasions thereafter, but were unable to 
get a response. (T.T. at 62-63.) 
(4) Lessees understood they had thirty days within which to test the equipment to 
ensure that it was operational. (T.T. at 60, 62, 72.) 
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(5) Due to Bottomline's lack of response, lessees brought in their own expert, Alan 
Shupe, to look at the computer equipment. Shupe was unable to get the system to operate. He 
made a phone call to Bottomline, but also received no response. (T.T. at 65, 76.) 
(6) Lessees immediately called Colonial Pacific to notify them of the trouble they were 
having with the equipment. Lessees asked Colonial Pacific to put a stop on the lease. (T.T. at 
63-64, 65-66.) 
(7) Lessees were told by a representative of Colonial Pacific that if they did not 
receive a payment statement, that "no news was good news" and they could assume the lease was 
"taken care of." (T.T. at 65-66.) 
(8) Lessees never received a payment statement from Colonial Pacific, nor did they 
have any other contact with Colonial Pacific for more than two years. (T.T. at 66, 70-71, 
(9) Lessees boxed up the computer equipment and returned it to Bottomline. This 
occurred within three weeks after first receiving the equipment. (T.T. at 64, 77.) 
(10) After having no other contact with Colonial Pacific for two years, lessees received 
a notice of default for failing to make payments under the lease. 
Taken together, the great weight of the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that 
lessees made a timely rejection of the leased goods. Lessees had the equipment for no more than 
three weeks, and were never able to get it to function properly. They seasonably notified Colonial 
Pacific to cancel the lease, and promptly returned the equipment to the supplier. Such facts in no 
way support a finding of acceptance. Instead, they clearly and convincingly demonstrate that 
lessees never accepted the leased goods. As a result, lessees' promise to make payments to 
Colonial Pacific was subject to cancellation. Lessees have fully complied with section 70A-2a-
509(2), which delineates the right of a lessee to reject nonconforming goods. Lessees now 
respectfully ask this Court to overturn the trial court's decision. 
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G. Colonial Pacific's Two Year Period of Silence Strongly Suggests the 
Company Acquiesced in the Cancellation of the Subject Lease 
Lack of acceptance is not the only method by which an irrevocable promise to make 
payments under a finance lease agreement can be canceled. Pursuant to section 70A-2a-407(2) of 
the Utah Commercial Code, such a promise can also be canceled with the "consent of the party to 
whom the promise runs." In the instant case, Colonial Pacific's pattern of silence and inaction for 
a period of over two years after lessees failed to make any payments under the lease provides 
compelling evidence that the company considered the lease timely revoked, and that it consented 
to cancellation of the same. Lessees testified that after three weeks of frustration and inability to 
get the leased equipment to operate properly, they boxed up the equipment and returned it to the 
vendor. They further testified that Colonial Pacific told them if they did not receive a payment 
booklet, they could assume the lease was taken care of. Colonial Pacific never sent lessees a 
payment booklet,2 nor did they have any other contact with lessees for more than two years. 
Colonial Pacific's persistent and prolonged pattern of silence and inaction, coupled with its own 
statement to lessees that they could assume the lease was taken care of if they did not receive a 
payment booklet, leave little doubt that Colonial Pacific consented to cancellation of the lease. If 
Colonial Pacific did not consent to the cancellation of the lease, it affirmatively misled lessees into 
believing it had so consented, and now stands before this Court with unclean hands. In either 
case, this Court should overturn the trial court's decision, and enter a dismissal of this matter with 
prejudice. 
2At trial, Colonial Pacific denied that it was responsible for sending a monthly statement to 
lessees. Despite that denial, its own documents clearly state that lessees would be receiving a 
monthly invoice. Plaintiffs "Lease Processing Sheet," comprising page 3 of Plaintiff s Exhibit #3, 
provides: "6. You will be invoiced monthly for $275.88." 
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II. COLONIAL PACIFIC FAILED TO SATISFY A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT TO THE LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the subject lease agreement 
was valid and binding under the Utah Commercial Code, because a condition precedent to the 
legal effectiveness of the lease had not been satisfied. Lessees were promised a thirty day trial 
period within which to test the leased equipment to ensure it was operational and would meet 
their needs. During this time, lessees were unable to get the system to operate properly. 
Consequently, they boxed up the equipment and returned it to the supplier. They also seasonably 
notified Colonial Pacific to stop the lease. For over two years, Colonial Pacific acted as if the 
lease had been canceled. Clearly, both parties understood that a condition precedent to the legal 
effectiveness of the lease had not been satisfied. 
It is well recognized that parol evidence may be offered to show a condition precedent to 
the legal effectiveness of a written agreement. As the New York Court of Appeals has stated: 
"Parol testimony is admissible to prove a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of a 
written agreement, if the condition precedent does not contradict the express terms of such a 
written agreement. A certain disparity is inevitable, of course, whenever a written promise is, by 
oral agreement of the parties, made conditional upon an event not expressed in the writing. Quite 
obviously, though, the parol evidence rule does not bar proof of every orally established condition 
precedent, but only of those which in a real sense contradict the express terms of the written 
agreement." Hicks v. Busk 180 N.E.2d 425 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1962) (citations omitted); see also 
Long Island Trust Co. v. Internafl Inst., 344 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976) (parol evidence 
admissible to show a condition precedent to enforcement of a written agreement). Utah adheres 
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to this general rule. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated: "[The parol evidence rule] does not 
preclude proof of agreements as to collateral matters relating to the contract or its performance, 
so long as they are not inconsistent with nor in repudiation of the terms of the written agreement. 
Nor does it prevent proof that a party did not perform an obligation which it was understood and 
agreed by the parties was a condition precedent to the contract becoming effective.... Whether 
there was such a separate agreement, not in contradiction of the written document, is for the trier 
of fact to determine." F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy. Inc.. 617 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 
1980). 
At trial, lessees offered uncontroverted evidence as to the existence of a condition 
precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease, i.e., that they were to have thirty days within 
which to test the leased equipment to ensure that it was operational and would meet their needs. 
The trial court completely ignored this evidence in rendering a decision, and failed to make any 
findings whatsoever as to whether or not all conditions precedent to the legal effectiveness of the 
lease were satisfied. This Court should find that a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness 
of the lease was not met, and should therefore overturn the trial court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in upholding the validity of the subject finance lease agreement. 
Despite overwhelming evidence indicating that lessees timely rejected the lease goods as 
nonconforming and defective, the trial court concluded that lessees were irrevocably committed to 
making payments under the lease. This conclusion is erroneous as a matter of law, and this Court 
should therefore reverse the trial court's decision. The trial court's decision should also be 
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reversed because a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease agreement was not 
satisfied. Lessees were promised a thirty day period within which to test the leased goods. 
Before the thirty day period expired, lessees boxed up the equipment and returned it to the 
supplier They seasonably notified Colonial Pacific of their rejection of the equipment, and were 
led to believe they had timely canceled the lease. Colonial Pacific has now obtained a judgment 
against lessees in excess of $20,000.00 for a defective 386 computer system that lessees had for 
three weeks and were never able to get to operate. Lessees respectfully ask this Court to set that 
judgment aside. 
DATED this )° day of August, 1998. 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
William P. Morrison 
Attorney for Appellants 
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J. BRUCE READING (USB No. 2700) 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
Attorney for Defendant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (001) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DIVISION II - STATE OF UTAH 




J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION dba 
JACK'S SOUTHWEST COLLISION 
REPAIR and Case No. 970001160 
JOHN W. CUMBERLEDGE, JR., 
Defendants. : Judge William W. Barrett 
The above-captioned matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable William W. Barrett, Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, on September 29, 1997, with the Plaintiff represented by and 
through its attorney of record, J. Bruce Reading, and the 
Defendants personally appearing with their attorney of record, 
William P. Morrison. The Court, being fully advised, enters the 
following Order: 
1. Judgment is awarded in favor of the Plaint Lff and 
against the Defendant for Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy 
Four and 30/100 Dollars ($16,874.30) for the following: 
a. Nine Thousand Six Hundred Forty Two and 83/100 
Dollars ($9,642.03) in unpaid finance lease payments; and 
b. Seven Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two and 
12/100 Dollars in accrued interest thereon from the date of default 
through the date of judgment at the contractual rate of eighteen 
percent (10%) per annum, aJv* H 
«#-
2. Plaintiff is awarded reasonable attorney LCCSAJLLI the 
amount of Four Thousand Four Hundred 5*av-eft artd y&iHtfrtr Dollars 
($4,447.30?. 
3. The total judgment awarded by this Order and . 
7^* * ^cucKiif-fir^ bit?-
Judgment is Twenty One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty One and3o/lOO 
Dollars ($21,321,60) . 
4. This judgment shall accrue interest at the statutory 
post-judgment interest rate and is subject to augmentation for 
costs of collection. 




APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
William P. Morrison 




J . BRUCLC RL AD 1NG (USB N o . 2 7 0 0 ) 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Defendant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 04111 
Telephone: (001) LTJ1-7070 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DIVISION II - STATE OK UTAH 
COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING ; FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CORPORATION, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION dba 
JACK'S SOUTHWEST COLLISION 
REPAIR and Case No. 9700011.00 
JOHN W. CUMBERLEDGE, JR., 
Defendants. : Judge William W Barrett 
The abovc-captioned matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable William W. Barrett, Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, on September 29, 1997, with the Plaintiff represented by and 
through its attorney of record, J. Bruce Readuig, and the 
Defendants personally appearing with their attorney of rocord, 
William P. Morrison. The Court hereby enters the Loll owing: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant J.W.C.J.R. Corporation dba Jack'.*; 
Southwest Collision Repair and Plaintiff Colonial Pacific Leasing 
Corporation entered into a valid and binding lease contract on 
June 9, 1993. 
20 Defendant John W. Cumberledge, Jr. signed a 
written guarantee of Defendant J.W.C.J.R.'s lease contract with 
Plaintiff on June 9, 1993. 
3. Defendant J.W.C.J.R. used Plaintiff's financing to 
procure computer equipment from Bottomline Systems, Inc. 
4. The equipment was delivered and installed at 
Defendant J.W.C.J.R.'s place of business by Bottomline Systems, 
Inc., but it did not function properly. 
5. Defendant John Cumberledge informed Plaintiff on 
two occasions that the equipment was not operational. 
6. The equipment was returned to Bottomline Systems, 
Inc. subsequent to the signing and execution of the finance 
lease. 
7. The Defendants were not contacted by Plaintiff 
until approximately two years thereafter, at which time Plaintiff 
sought payment in full from Defendants. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendants entered into a valid and binding 
lease contract with Plaintiff. 
2. The lease contract is governed by the provisions 
of the Utah Commercial Code wherein it is categorized as a 
finance lease. 
3. The Defendants failed to uphold their duty to 
comply with the terms of the finance lease. 
4. The Defendants' failure to make payments to 
Plaintiff pursuant to the finance lease constituted a breach of 
contract. 
5. Based upon the Defendants' breach, Plaintiff 
should be awarded judgment in the amount of Sixteen Thousand 
Eight Hundred Seventy Four and no/100 Dollars ($16,074.00), 
together with reasonable attorney's fees, post-judgment interest, 
and associated costs of collection. 
DATED this day of December, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
William W. Barrett 
District Court Judge 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
William P. Morrison 
Attorney for Defendants 
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[I] COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE, MIDDLE SECTION, AT NASHVILLE 
[2] No. 01-A-01-9104-CV-00147 
[3] 1992.TN. 1470 <http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] Augusts, 1992 
[5] HIGHLAND RIM CONSTRUCTORS, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
v. 
ATLANTIC SOFTWARE CORPORATION, DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
[61 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR LINCOLN COUNTY, AT 
FAYETTEVILLE, TENNESSEE. THE HONORABLE LEE RUSSELL, JUDGE. 
No. 124-89 
[7] For Plaintiff Appellee: C George Caudle, Sondra F. Wooten, 
Caldwell, Heggie & Helton, Chattanooga, Tennessee. 
[8] For Defendant/Appellant: Pamela R. ODwyer, Paty, Rymer & 
Ulin, Chattanooga, Tennessee. 
[9] Koch, Jr., Todd, Lewis 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by. Koch 
[II] This appeal involves the sale of a computer system to a 
construction company. After receiving what it considered to 
be inadequate training in the use of the system, the 
construction company sued the seller in the Circuit Court for 
Lincoln County seeking recovery of the purchase price and 
damages. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the 
construction company $32,909 in compensatory damages and 
attorneys fees. The seller has appealed, asserting that the 
construction company did not effectively reject the system. 
disagree and affirm the trial court 
[12] I. 
[13] Highland Rim Constructors ("Highland Rim") is a commercial 
construction company located in Fayetteville, Tennessee. In 
late 1988, Ronnie Wallace, the company's owner, decided to 
purchase a computer system to help stay abreast with the 
growth in his business. Even though Mr. Wallace had no prior 
experience with computers, several of his employees assured 
him that a computer system would be beneficial 
[14] Highland Rim sought proposals from several vendors and, on 
January 31,1989, entered into a "system purchase and 
software license agreementw with Atlantic Software 
Corporation ("Atlantic"), a Colorado corporation with an 
office in nearby Huntsville, Alabama. The agreement required 
Atlantic to supply Highland Rim not only with the hardware 
and software for the system but also with sixty hours of 
on-site training. In addition, the agreement required lull 
payment before the training took place and contained the 
following "money-back purchase guarantee:" 
[15] If you are not satisfied with our products within 30 days 
after attending the classroom training at our offices, your 
complete system can be returned for a full refund of the "Net 
Computer System Purchase Price" only. This is applicable only 
if Atlantic had been paid in full for the system as detailed 
above and if the system is returned to our office in 
"like-new" conditioa "Guarantee is UNAVAILABLE if Customer 
chooses to "Lease" computer system. 
[16] The hardware and software were delivered on February 21, 
1989, and Highland Rim paid the full $22,000 purchase price 
at that time. 
[17] Atlantic hired Rhett Leake, an independent trainer it had 
used on other installations, to provide the training for 
Highland Rim's employees. Mr. Leake was already familiar with 
the system, and his only instructions were to schedule as 
many training days per week as possible and to complete the 
training as quickly as he could 
[18] The training began on February 27,1989 but did not proceed 
very satisfactorily. Highland Rim's employees did not like 
Mr. Leake's training methods, and the training sessions were 
sporadic and ineffectual because of scheduling problems and 
other interruptions caused by the employees' work. By the 
time Mr. Leak conducted his last training session on June 12, 
1989, he had provided only 57.5 hours of training, and 
Highland Rim's employees were able to operate only one of the 
nine software applications. 
[19] The slowness and ineffectiveness of the training infuriated 
Mr. Wallace. He summoned James L, Wiggins, Atlantic's 
Southeast Regional Sales Manager to his office on July 7, 
1989 and bluntly informed him that he had lost faith in 
Atlantic and that he wanted his money back. Mr. Wiggins 
stated that he did not have authority to authorize a refund. 
However, he told Mr. Wallace that he would try to arrange for 
Mr. Wallace to meet with James A, Howell, Atlantic's 
president, who was planning to be in the area during the 
following week. 
[20] The meeting never occurred, and Mr. Wallace's repeated 
telephone calls to Mr. Howell went unanswered. This further 
upset Mr. Wallace, and on August 9,1989, Highland Rim's 
office manager warned Atlantic that "suit will be filed" 
unless Mr. Howell returned Mr. Wallace's telephone call by 
August 11,1989. 
[21] Mr. Howell did not return Mr. Wallace's telephone call. 
Instead, his wife, who was Atlantic's operations manager, 
sent Mr. Wallace two letters. The first, dated August 10, 
1989, offered additional training at no cost in Denver or in 
Fayetteville as long as Highland Rim would agree to pay the 
trainer's expenses in advance. The second, dated August 11, 
1989, informed Mr. Wallace that he had not properly exercised 
his rights under the money-back purchase guarantee and that 
Atlantic intended to pursue counterclaims if he proceeded 
with his "frivolous lawsuit" 
[22] Approximately one month after Atlantic's last letter, 
Highland Rim sued Atlantic, alleging that it had breached the 
agreement and had made negligent misrepresentations by 
failing "to provide the essential support training and 
support elements of the contract" The trial court heard the 
case without a jury on October 9,1990 and awarded Highland 
Rim $22,000 in compensatory damages and $10,909 in attorneys 
fees. 
[23] n. 
[24] This case involves a hybrid agreement requiring Atlantic to 
supply Highland Rim with both goods and services. Since 
Article 2 applies only to "transactions in goods," Tenn. Code 
Ann. 47-2-102 (1979), we must first determine whether 
Atlantic's sale of an integrated computer system to Highland 
Rim is a transaction in goods. 
[25] Courts employ the "predominant element test" to determine 
whether a hybrid contract involves a transaction in goods. 
The test requires the courts to view the transaction in its 
entirety and to identify the most significant element of the 
transaction. See Hudson v. Town & Country True Value 
Hardware, Inc., 666 S.W.2d 51,53 (Tenn. 1984). If the sale 
of goods predominates, and the services are only incidental, 
then the agreement involves a transaction in goods and is 
governed by Article 2.1 Ronald A. Anderson, Uniform 
Commercial Code 2-105:38(1981). 
[26] Other courts, using the predominant element test, have found 
that contracts for the sale of computer systems or related 
components, including hardware, software, training, and 
support services, are contracts for the sale of goods 
governed by Article 2„ RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 
F.2d 543,546 (9th Cir, 1985) (software, training, systems 
repairs, and upgrades); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. 
Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737,742-43 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(hardware and software); Nelson Business Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. 
Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172,1174 (Del 1987) (computer 
system); USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 
888,894 (Mass. App. Ct 1989) (computer system); 
Communications Group, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 
527 N.Y.S.2d 341,344 (N.Y. Civ. Ct 1988) (software); Camara 
v. Hill, 596 A.2d 349,351 (Vt 1991) (computer system). 
[27] We agree with the reasoning of these precedents. Atlantic's 
agreement with Highland Rim was predominantly for the sale of 
an integrated computer system. Its obligation to provide 
training in the use of the system was incidental to the 
purchase of the system itself. Accordingly, the transaction 
is one involving goods, and the parties' rights and remedies 
are governed by Article 2. 
[28] m. 
[29] A buyer must either accept or reject goods within a 
reasonable tlnig alia1 UitftrJender or delivery, I. N. Price 
Co. v. Hamilton Produce Co., 8 Tenn. Civ! App. (Higgins) 467, 
470 (1918); Tenn. Code Ana 47-2-602(1) -606(l)(b) (1979), 
but acceptance cannot occur until the buyer hashada 
reasonaoie"opportunity to inspect the goods. Tenn. Code Ann. 
I 47-2-606(1). The reasonableness ot the opportunity to 
t depends upon the nature of the goods and the terms of 
rtransaction. See Moses v. Newman, 658 S.W.2d 119,121 
\ I (Tenn. Ct App. 1983). 
[30] The parties may define their own reasonable time periods by 
agfranent Tenn. Code Ana 47-1-204(1) (14)79). Inlffis ~~ 
case, the money-back purchase guarantee contains just such an 
agreementgWhen read in light of the parties' agreement to 
provide on-site training in Fayetteville the guarantee 
permits Highland Rim to accept or reject the entire system 
within thirty days after the completion of the training. \ 
[31] Paying for the goods after they have been tendered or 
delivered is one circumstance tending to signify acceptance 
of the goods. Tenn. Code Ann. 47-2-606 comment 3. It is 
not, however, a conclusive circumstance, especially when the 
transaction involves goods whose non-conformities can only be 
discovered after installation and use. United Airlines, Inc. 
v. Conductron Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1272,1282 (I1L App. Ct 
1979); Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723,727 
(Minn. 1985). As the Supreme Court of Montana has noted: 
[32] A court must be realistic in appraising the sufficiency of a 
buyer's opportunity to inspect andshould not hold that the 
fijryer hqs aqcfipM wlipnrharJTisg-of the technical or complex 
~ ^ nature of the goods the buyer cannot determine whether they 
are satisfactory until he actually makes use of them. 
[33] Steinmetz v. Robertas, 637 P.2d 31,36 (Mont 1981). 
[34] The agreement required Highland Rim to pay for the entire 
computer system when the hardware was delivered, even before 
the software was installed or the users trained. The system 
was sufficiently complex that Highland Rim could not have 
determined whether it was satisfactory until after it had a 
chance to use it Thus, Highland Rim's payment and use of the 
system prior to July 7,1989, do not amount to acceptance of 
the system. 
[35] The buyer must give the seller seasonable notice inorder to 
reject the goods, l^na Cffite7$nnT47-2-602( 1). The notice 
*need not be uTwrm^and need not Be couchedlh any special 
terms, it is adequagg it reasoiiabTy Ihfomi^the ogig; ~~ 
party that the transaction is claimed to mvolve a_breach. 
TenoCode A5ttT47-l-201(26), -20f(27) (Supp. 1991) and 
Tena Code Ann. 47-2-607 comment 4 (1979). 
[36] Highland Rim effectively rejected Atlantic's computer system 
on July 7,1989, when Mr. Wallace informed Mr. Wiggins of his 
dissatisfaction with the computer system because of the 
inadequacy of the training. The conversation occurred within _ 
thirty days after the last day of training and could have 
left no doubt in Mr. Wiggins' mind that Mr>_Wallac&bdIeved 
that Atlantic had breached the agreement and that he had 
decided to cancel the contract "^^-———-—— 
[37] IV. 
[38] Even if Highland Rim's notice was within the time provided 
for in the parties' agreement Atlantic insists that it was 
not effective because Highland Rim did not give Atlantic a 
reasonable opportunity to cure. Article 2 provides sellers an 
opportunity to cure a nonconforming tender when the time for 
performance has not expired, Tena Code Ana 47-2-508(1) 
(1979), or when the seller has grounds to believe that its 
tender would be acceptable. Tena Code Ana 47-2-508(2). 
Atlantic's purported tender satisfies neither requirement 
[39] Atlantic's money-back purchase guarantee provided that the 
time for Atlantic to perform under the contract expired 
thirty days after the completion of the training. It also 
gave Highland Rim the unrestricted right to reject the system 
and to cancel the contract within the thirty-day period 
without first giving Atlantic an opportunity to cure. 
Therefore, Atlantic contracted away its opportunity to cure 
if Highland Rim rejected the system within thirty days after 
the completion of training. 
[40] From the very beginning of its dealings with Highland Rim, 
Atlantic knew that its customer placed a high priority on 
training. Highland Rim insisted on contracting for more 
training than Atlantic believed was necessary and also 
insisted that the training take place in its own offices in 
Fayetteville rather than in Denver. Thus, for the purposes of 
Tena Code Ana 47-2-508(2), Atlantic had no reasonable 
grounds to believe that the type of sporadic, ineffectual 
training it actually provided would be acceptable to Highland 
Rim. 
[41] In any event, Atlantic's August 10,1989 offer to provide 
additional training was not a reasonable offer to cure. 
Atlantic knew that off-site training in Denver would not be 
acceptable to Highland Rim because Highland Rim had insisted 
on on-site training In the past Atlantic's offer to provide 
additional on-site training was likewise ineffectual because 
it would have required Highland Rim to incur more expenses 
man it had contracted for. An offer to cure that increases 
the cost to the buyer is not an effective offer. 
[42] V. 
[43] Even if Highland Rim effectively rejected the computer 
system, Atlantic also asserts that Highland Rim's remedies 
were limited by the agreement and that Highland Rim was not 
entitled to pursue even its limited remedies because it kept 
and used the system after giving its notice of rejection. We 
have determined that Highland Rim had available the full 
panoply of Article 2 remedies and that requiring Highland Rim 
to give up its security interest in the goods in order to 
obtain a refund unconscionably conflicts with Article 2. 
[44] Buyers who reject nonconforming goods may agree to limit 
their Article 2 remedies as long as the agreement is not 
unconscionable. However, agreements providing for remedies in 
addition to or in substitution for those provided in Article 
2 will be considered optional unless they are "expressly 
agreed to be exclusive," Tena Code Ana 47-2-719(l)(b) 
(1979). Since the remedy in Atlantic's money-back purchase 
guarantee was not expressly exclusive, it was not Highland 
Rim's sole remedy. 
[45] A buyer may reject goods that do not conform to the contract 
Tena Code Ann. 47-2-601(a) (1979). Following an effective 
rejection, the buyer may cancel the contract and recover so 
much of the purchase price as has been paid *ml Tenn. Code 
Ann. 47-2-711(1) (19791; True v. J. B. Deeds & Sons, 151 
Tenn. 630,635-36,271 S.W. 41,42 (1925); Patton v. McHone, 
822 S.W.2d 608,618 (Tenn. CL App. 1991). 
[46] Buyers who reject goods may, depending on the circumstances, 
store the rejected goods, ship them back to the seller, or 
resell them for the seller's account Term. Code Ana 
47-2-604 (1979). If the buyer has paid any portion of the 
purchase price, it has a security interest in the goods and 
may retain them in order to perfect its security interest 
Tena Code Ana 47-2-711(3). Retaining goods when a buyer 
has a security interest in them is not an act inconsistent 
with the seller's ownership under Tena Code Ana 
47-2-606(lXc) (1979). 3 William D. Hawkland, Uniform 
Commercial Code Series 2-711:03(1984). 
[47] In certain circumstances, buyers with a security interest in 
rejected goods may also continue to use the goods in a 
reasonable manner without being deemed to have re-accepted 
them Alden Press, Inc. v. Block & Co., 527 N.E.2d 489,495 
(111. Ct App. 1988); McCuiiough v. Bill Swad 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 449 N.E.2d 1289,1292 (Ohio 1983). 
Yates v. Clifford Motors, Inc., 423 A.2d 1262,1271-72 (Pa. 
Super. Ct 1980). But if they continue to use the goods, they 
should be made to pay the fair value for their use from the 
time of their rejection. See Moore v. Howard 
Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227,230 (Tena Ct App. 
1972); 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code 8-3, at 413-14 (3d ed. 1988) ("White & 
Summers"); 4 Ronald A. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 
2-715:21 (1983). 
[48] It is not commercially reasonable to require a buyer to give 
up its Tena Code Ana 47-2-711(3) security interest in 
goods in return for a less certain prospect of a refund of 
the purchase price. Therefore, Atlantic's money-back purchase 
guarantee was unenforceable to the extent that it attempted 
to force Highland Rim to give up its security interest in the 
goods. 
[49] When Mr. Wallace notified Mr. Wiggins on July 7,1989 that he 
was rejecting the goods and canceling the contract, Mr. 
Wiggins declined to give him directions concerning the return 
of the system. In fact, Atlantic later insisted that Highland 
Rim had no rights under the money-back purchase guarantee. 
Highland Rim's failure to return the goods does not undermine 
the validity of its rejection. 
[50] Since Highland Rim continued to use the computer system after 
rejecting it and canceling the contract, Atlantic would have 
been entitled to offset the purchase price by the fair value 
of Highland Rim's use of the system. However, the burden of 
proof of the amount of this offset was on Atlantic. White & 
Summers, (supra), 8-3, at 414. Since Atlantic introduced 
no proof concerning the fair value of Highland Rim's limited 
use of the computer system it is not entitled to an offset 
now. 
[51] VL 
[52] We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the trial court 
for whatever other proceedings may be required We also tax 
the costs to the Atlantic Software Corporation and its surety 
for which execution, if necessary, may issue. 
[53] WILLIAM C.KOCH, JR., JUDGE 
[54] CONCUR: 
[55] HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE 
[56] SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE 
Opinion Footnotes 
[57] *ml Buyers are also entitled to incidental and consequential 
damages under Tenn. Code Ana 47-2-715 (1979). The trial 
court did not award these damages in this case, apparently 
because Highland Rim's proof was too speculative. Highland 
Rim has not appealed from the denial of consequential 
damages; therefore, this issue is not before us. 
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